A quarterly e-newsletter from Orgain Bell & Tucker, LLP
 


Spring 2009

This Issue

 
  • I'VE BEEN TOLD THIS AGREEMENT NOT TO COMPETE ISN'T WORTH THE PAPER IT'S PRINTED ON...IS THAT TRUE?

  • WEBSITE TERMS OF USE

  • HARASSMENT POLICY VIOLATES FREE SPEECH

  • ESTATE PLANNING: A GIFT OF DEBT

  • IN THE FIRM

 

 
   
 


BEAUMONT
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Phone: 409-838-6412

Fax: 409-838-6959

 

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The Woodlands, Texas 77380

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Phone: 409-386-0386
Fax: 409-386-0900

 

For more information
visit our website at: www.obt.com

 

 
     
 

By Robert Hambright, OBT Partner.
Robert can be reached at 409.838.6412 and rjh@obt.com

Generally, a covenant not to compete seeks to restrict a departedWrinkled Crumpled Paper employee from going to work for a competitor or starting a competing business for a period of time in a given market area. Typically the covenant is part of a collection of employment
documents designed to protect an employer's business, customer lists, trade secrets and other confidential information.


We've received a number of calls in recent years that reveal some common misimpressions about covenants not to compete in Texas. We recall a recent case in which a client avoided serious litigation by questioning a prospective employee's assurance that a covenant not to compete he had signed with a former employer was "not worth the paper it was written on because Texas is an employment at will state." A word to the wise: treat these agreements with respect. While in years past many Texas courts were reluctant to enforce these covenants, the Texas statutes have been updated and the clear trend in the courts today is to enforce the agreements if they are drafted correctly.


On April 17, 2009, the Texas Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors v. Fielding, which is the latest in a long line of cases dealing with covenants not to compete. The case involved an agreement signed by Mr. Fielding, a CPA, who had left his accounting firm to start a competing business and had
taken some of the firm's clients with him. Mr. Fielding had been an "employee at will," meaning that either he or the accounting firm could end their employment for any reason at any time without obligation. However, Mr. Fielding had signed an agreement in which he had promised to keep information obtained at his prior firm confidential and that contained a "client purchase provision." Under the client purchase provision, Mr. Fielding agreed to pay a fee to his former firm in accordance with a formula any time he performed work for a client of the accounting firm within one year after leaving. Such an agreement is considered a type of covenant not to compete because it creates a financial disincentive for departing employees to compete with their former employers by working for the same clients or customers.

The so-called "Covenant Not to Compete Act" in Texas provides in part as follows:


"[A] covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee."

 

The phrase "otherwise enforceable agreement" has been at the center of several recent cases. An employment contract for a specific term or one that can only be terminated for "cause" is an "enforceable agreement" and, therefore, if a covenant not to
compete is part of the employment contract it is also enforceable assuming the other requirements of the statute are satisfied. The situation becomes more complicated where employment is at will and neither party has a legally "enforceable agreement" for continued employment. In employment at will cases some other type of "enforceable agreement" between the employer and employee must exist or else a covenant not to compete is invalid and will fail. Depending on the facts, an employer's promise to provide an employee at will access to confidential information, coupled with the
employee's promise not to disclose such information, can be considered an "otherwise enforceable agreement" that will support a covenant not to compete.


The facts of the Fielding case presented a unique situation because while the contract Mr. Fielding signed required him to keep the accounting firm's client information confidential, there was no corresponding language in the agreement obligating the firm to give Fielding any confidential information. Mr. Fielding argued, therefore, that the agreement he had signed was one-sided, "illusory" and unenforceable because at no time could he have sued the firm to force it to provide him with anything. Although it took about four years of litigation, the accounting firm finally won the case in the Texas Supreme Court. The high court held that an "enforceable agreement" existed because the accounting firm's agreement to provide confidential information could be "implied" from the circumstances. According to the court, "[w]hen the nature of the work the employee is hired to perform requires confidential information to be provided for the work to be performed by the employee, the employer impliedly promises confidential information will be provided." The court observed that, starting the second day of his employment, the accounting firm had actually given Mr. Fielding confidential information so that he could perform his duties.


The Fielding case illustrates that the significance of covenants not to compete should not be underestimated in Texas and that, depending on the facts, they can be and are enforceable in court if the controlling legal standards are met.

 

 
 

 

   

The terms for using websites, often taking the form of legalese to which many users pay little attention, are more important than they are interesting to read. The terms restrict how the public can use a website to obtain information, purchase goods and services, or take part in web-based social networking. Largely because of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the terms of use can now be used offensively either by prosecutors charging individuals with wrongdoing emanating from a violation of the terms, or by website owners themselves seeking civil remedies for legal injuries to them from what amounts to a breach of contract.
 

The growing and evolving body of court decisions concerning terms of use and the CFAA should prompt owners of websites to adopt and regularly review the terms for using their sites, giving special attention to the following considerations:
 

• Instead of using just any boilerplate legal language, the terms of use should be tailored to fit the particular risks posed to the business and users of the site;

• The terms of use must be easily seen and understood to have their intended effect. This means that they should be conspicuous on the site and written so as to clearly indicate conduct that is and is not authorized. There may be no one fail-safe approach, but one court has said that there is adequate communication of the terms of use if the terms can be accessed from all pages on the site;

• Website owners may want to make explicit the agreement to abide by the terms of use by including "clickwrap" or "browsewrap" agreements that make consent to the terms a condition of using the site. If the user clicks on "I accept," but then violates the terms of use, this essentially nails down the fact, which may be pivotal in later criminal or civil court cases, that the user lacked the necessary authorization for his actions. For example, in a recent criminal case in which a university student secured access to a university computer site and stole Social Security numbers and other confidential data, the prosecution was aided by the fact that the student had signed an "acceptable use"

computer policy that prohibited the very actions which led to the criminal charges;

• Putting the terms of use in place is one thing, but then monitoring compliance and notifying users of suspected or confirmed violations result in enhanced protection. In the case of the university student who was improperly gathering sensitive personal information, the university had on three occasions detected that the student's computer was performing unauthorized and suspicious functions, and had informed him of its discoveries. When the student nonetheless continued to scan and infiltrate computers without authorization, adding to his database of stolen information, his fate in the ensuing criminal case was sealed.

 

 
   
 

When a male graduate student pursuing a degree in military history was inclined to speak his mind in classroom discussions about women in combat and women in the military more generally, he felt inhibited by the university's broadly worded policy on sexual harassment.
 

In pertinent part, the policy stated that "all forms of sexual harassment are prohibited, including . . . expressive, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual or gender-motivated nature, when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work, educational performance, or status; or such conduct has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment." The student sued the university to prohibit the enforcement of the policy on the ground that it had a chilling effect on the exercise of his right to free speech.
 

A federal appeals court sided with the graduate student. The sexual harassment policy's prohibition of expressive conduct of a "gender-motivated nature" that had the purpose or effect of either unreasonably interfering with other individuals or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. It impermissibly swept within its reach speech that should not be subjected to restrictive regulation.
 

Regarding the "gender-motivated" characteristic of speech, the court wondered: "Whose gender must serve as the motivation, the speaker's or the listener's? And does it matter? Additionally, we must be aware that ‘gender,' to some people, is a fluid concept. Even if we narrow the term ‘gender-motivated' to ‘because of one's sex,' we are far from certain that this limitation still does not encompass expression on a broad range of social issues."
 

The term "gender-motivated" also necessarily required an inquiry into the motivation of the speaker, so that the policy punished not only speech that actually caused disruption, but also speech that merely intended to do so. To protect core forms of speech, there should have been a requirement in the policy that the conduct at issue objectively and subjectively create a hostile environment. A school must show that, before prohibiting it, targeted speech is so severe or pervasive that it will actually cause material disruption, and the university's policy was fatally deficient for not having such a requirement.
 

It was important to the court's decision that the challenged harassment policy was that of a university, as opposed to an elementary school or a high school. It is well recognized that, in the words of United States Supreme Court decisions, "[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,"' and "[t]he First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse."
 

Discussion by adult students in a college classroom should not be restricted, while certain speech which cannot be prohibited to adults may be prohibited to public elementary and high school students. This is particularly true when considering that public elementary and high school administrators have the unique responsibility to act in the place of parents, a disciplinary and protective role not shared by their counterparts in colleges and universities. Thus, in the case of the plaintiff graduate student, the court kept in mind that the university's administrators were granted less leeway in regulating student speech than are administrators responsible for younger and more vulnerable students.
 

 
     
 
     

 

If you inherit property, of course you should be grateful and count your blessings. Still, consider the possibility that the gift may come with a big string attached—a debt linked to the property, such as is particularly common with real estate or a car. In that event, the question arises as to whether the debt must be satisfied from the particular asset or from the decedent's estate more generally. How this question is answered can cause a big swing in the respective gift amounts for beneficiaries of an estate.
 

Historically, the law presumed that the debt was not to be paid from the property that was connected to it. The reasoning was that a true gift should not come laden with such a burden. Over time, as taking on debt became commonplace, this thinking changed and statutes flipped the conventional assumption. Increasingly, these laws start from the premise that the property left to someone includes the debt on the property, unless the decedent in
his or her will clearly indicated a different intent. That is where careful estate planning, with professional guidance, comes in.
 

It is best to leave no doubt for the ordinary lay reader of a will. A general directive in the will to pay all debts of the testator is too nebulous. Instead, if the intent is not to keep the asset joined to the debt, language something like this should be used in a will: "If [the specific asset] is subject to a mortgage, security interest, or other lien, I direct that my executor pay the debt from other property of my estate which is not given to a specific person or entity."
 

This scenario was played out recently in a case in which a farmer left to his (favored?) son three different farms, each of which was encumbered by debt. To his other son he left the residue of the estate. When the father died, the executor used part of the estate proceeds to pay off the loans to the farms, so that the first son would receive them debt-free. Not surprisingly, the second son, whose inheritance was thereby diminished, brought the matter to court.
 

The second son prevailed, forcing payment of the debts for the farms to come from the farms themselves. The father's will directed in a general way that debts were to be paid from the estate. However, under the relevant state statute, that was not a sufficiently explicit indication of intent to satisfy the debts on the farms from the residuary estate. In other words, the will had not clearly shown an intent that the first son was to receive the farms debt-free. As a result, the first son got the three farms, but he, not the second son, also got the responsibility for paying off the

attached encumbrances, which totaled almost a quarter of a million dollars.
 

 
 
 
 
   










 

Congratulations to the following OBT attorneys who have been selected for inclusion in the 2009 edition of The Best Lawyers in America:

 

Robert J. Hambright – who is being honored at the Best Lawyers 25th Anniversary Event in Atlanta, Georgia, April 23-25, 2009. Robert has been listed since the publication's

inception 25 years ago honoring his work and dedication in the specialties of Labor and

Employment

Law Jack P. Carroll – Personal Injury Litigation
 

Benny H. Hughes, Jr. – listed for at least 10 years in the specialty of Corporate Law
 

Gilbert I. Low – listed for at least 20 years in the specialties of Commercial Litigation,

Personal Injury Litigation, and White-Collar Criminal Defense
 

J. Hoke Peacock II – listed for at least 10 years in the specialty of Commercial Litigation
 

Gary Neale Reger – listed for at least 10 years in the specialties of Banking Law,

Bankruptcy and Creditor-Debtor Rights Law and Real Estate Law
 

Jo Ben Whittenburg – Health Care Law and Personal Injury Litigation

 

Regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence in the United States, selection to Best Lawyers is based on an exhaustive peer-review of more than 2.5 million evaluations by the top attorneys in the country.

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Orgain Bell & Tucker, LLP proudly recognizes its attorneys listed in Super Lawyers 2008 magazine: Gilbert I. "Buddy" Low and J. Hoke Peacock II (Business Litigation); Donean Surratt, Michael Truncale and Jo Ben Whittenburg (Civil Litigation Defense); Robert Hambright (Employment Litigation Defense); Curry Cooksey (Healthcare); and David Fisher (Personal Injury Plaintiff: General).

 

The annual list by Law & Politics and the publishers of Texas Monthly magazine recognizes the top five percent of lawyers who have received the highest point totals as chosen by their peers, as well as through independent research. They identify highly talented lawyers in specialty areas for their outstanding professional achievements.

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We extend our congratulations to the following attorneys for their selection on the 2008 Texas Super Lawyers-Rising Stars list: Nathan Brandimarte (Business Litigation); Denise Gremillion (Personal Injury – Medical Malpractice); Ronda Harkey (Immigration); Greg Wilkins (Insurance Coverage). The annual list by Law & Politics and the publishers of Texas Monthly magazine names the state's top up-and-coming attorneys.

 

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THE ARTICLES AND OTHER INFORMATION IN THIS NEWSLETTER ARE NOT LEGAL ADVICE. YOU SHOULD CONSULT AN ATTORNEY FOR ADVICE REGARDING YOUR INDIVIDUAL SITUATION. WE INVITE YOU TO CONTACT US AND WELCOME YOUR CALLS, LETTERS AND ELECTRONIC MAIL. YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS NEWSLETTER AND CONTACTING US DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. PLEASE DO NOT SEND ANY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO US UNTIL AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. THANK YOU.

 

 
 
     


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