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A quarterly e-newsletter
from Orgain Bell & Tucker, LLP
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Spring 2009
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This
Issue
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I'VE BEEN TOLD THIS
AGREEMENT NOT TO COMPETE
ISN'T WORTH THE PAPER IT'S
PRINTED ON...IS THAT TRUE?
-
WEBSITE TERMS OF USE
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HARASSMENT POLICY VIOLATES
FREE SPEECH
-
ESTATE PLANNING: A GIFT OF
DEBT
-
IN THE FIRM
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BEAUMONT
470 Orleans Street
P.O. Box 1751
Beaumont, Texas 77704-1751
Phone: 409-838-6412
Fax: 409-838-6959
HOUSTON
– THE WOODLANDS
10077 Grogan's Mill Rd.,
Suite 500
The Woodlands, Texas 77380
Phone: 281-296-8877
Fax: 281-296-7444
SILSBEE
560 South Fourth Street
Silsbee, Texas 77656
Phone: 409-386-0386
Fax: 409-386-0900
For more information
visit our website at:
www.obt.com
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By Robert Hambright, OBT Partner.
Robert can be reached at 409.838.6412
and
rjh@obt.com
Generally, a covenant not to compete
seeks to restrict a departed
employee from going to work for a
competitor or starting a competing
business for a period of time in a given
market area. Typically the covenant is
part of a collection of employment
documents designed to protect an
employer's business, customer lists,
trade secrets and other confidential
information.
We've received a number of calls in
recent years that reveal some common
misimpressions about covenants not to
compete in Texas. We recall a recent
case in which a client avoided serious
litigation by questioning a prospective
employee's assurance that a covenant not
to compete he had signed with a former
employer was "not worth the paper it was
written on because Texas is an
employment at will state." A word to the
wise: treat these agreements with
respect. While in years past many Texas
courts were reluctant to enforce these
covenants, the Texas statutes have been
updated and the clear trend in the
courts today is to enforce the
agreements if they are drafted
correctly.
On April 17, 2009, the Texas Supreme
Court handed down its opinion in Mann
Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors v.
Fielding, which is the latest in a long
line of cases dealing with covenants not
to compete. The case involved an
agreement signed by Mr. Fielding, a CPA,
who had left his accounting firm to
start a competing business and had
taken some of the firm's clients with
him. Mr. Fielding had been an "employee
at will," meaning that either he or the
accounting firm could end their
employment for any reason at any time
without obligation. However, Mr.
Fielding had signed an agreement in
which he had promised to keep
information obtained at his prior firm
confidential and that contained a
"client purchase provision." Under the
client purchase provision, Mr. Fielding
agreed to pay a fee to his former firm
in accordance with a formula any time he
performed work for a client of the
accounting firm within one year after
leaving. Such an agreement is considered
a type of covenant not to compete
because it creates a financial
disincentive for departing employees to
compete with their former employers by
working for the same clients or
customers.
The so-called "Covenant Not to Compete
Act" in Texas provides in part as
follows:
"[A] covenant not to compete is
enforceable if it is ancillary to or
part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement at the time the agreement is
made to the extent that it contains
limitations as to time, geographical
area, and scope of activity to be
restrained that are reasonable and do
not impose a greater restraint than is
necessary to protect the goodwill or
other business interest of the promisee."
The phrase "otherwise enforceable
agreement" has been at the center of
several recent cases. An employment
contract for a specific term or one that
can only be terminated for "cause" is an
"enforceable agreement" and, therefore,
if a covenant not to
compete is part of the employment
contract it is also enforceable assuming
the other requirements of the statute
are satisfied. The situation becomes
more complicated where employment is at
will and neither party has a legally
"enforceable agreement" for continued
employment. In employment at will cases
some other type of "enforceable
agreement" between the employer and
employee must exist or else a covenant
not to compete is invalid and will fail.
Depending on the facts, an employer's
promise to provide an employee at will
access to confidential information,
coupled with the
employee's promise not to disclose such
information, can be considered an
"otherwise enforceable agreement" that
will support a covenant not to compete.
The facts of the Fielding case presented
a unique situation because while the
contract Mr. Fielding signed required
him to keep the accounting firm's client
information confidential, there was no
corresponding language in the agreement
obligating the firm to give Fielding any
confidential information. Mr. Fielding
argued, therefore, that the agreement he
had signed was one-sided, "illusory" and
unenforceable because at no time could
he have sued the firm to force it to
provide him with anything. Although it
took about four years of litigation, the
accounting firm finally won the case in
the Texas Supreme Court. The high court
held that an "enforceable agreement"
existed because the accounting firm's
agreement to provide confidential
information could be "implied" from the
circumstances. According to the court,
"[w]hen the nature of the work the
employee is hired to perform requires
confidential information to be provided
for the work to be performed by the
employee, the employer impliedly
promises confidential information will
be provided." The court observed that,
starting the second day of his
employment, the accounting firm had
actually given Mr. Fielding confidential
information so that he could perform his
duties.
The Fielding case illustrates that the
significance of covenants not to compete
should not be underestimated in Texas
and that, depending on the facts, they
can be and are enforceable in court if
the controlling legal standards are met.
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 The
terms for using websites, often taking
the form of legalese to which many users
pay little attention, are more important
than they are interesting to read. The
terms restrict how the public can use a
website to obtain information, purchase
goods and services, or take part in
web-based social networking. Largely
because of the federal Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA), the terms of use
can now be used offensively either by
prosecutors charging individuals with
wrongdoing emanating from a violation of
the terms, or by website owners
themselves seeking civil remedies for
legal injuries to them from what amounts
to a breach of contract.
The growing and evolving body of court
decisions concerning terms of use and
the CFAA should prompt owners of
websites to adopt and regularly review
the terms for using their sites, giving
special attention to the following
considerations:
• Instead of using just any boilerplate
legal language, the terms of use should
be tailored to
fit the particular risks posed to the
business and users of the site;
• The terms of use must be easily seen
and understood to have their intended
effect. This means that they should be
conspicuous on the site and written so
as to clearly indicate conduct that is
and is not authorized. There may be no
one fail-safe approach, but one court
has said that there is adequate
communication of the terms of use if the
terms can be accessed from all pages on
the site;
• Website owners may want to make
explicit the agreement to abide by the
terms of use by including "clickwrap" or
"browsewrap" agreements that make
consent to the terms a condition of
using the site. If the user clicks on "I
accept," but then violates the terms of
use, this essentially nails down the
fact, which may be pivotal in later
criminal or civil court cases, that the
user lacked the necessary authorization
for his actions. For example, in a
recent criminal case in which a
university student secured access to a
university computer site and stole
Social Security numbers and other
confidential data, the prosecution was
aided by the fact that the student had
signed an "acceptable use"
computer policy that prohibited the very
actions which led to the criminal
charges;
• Putting the terms of use in place is
one thing, but then monitoring
compliance and notifying users of
suspected or confirmed violations result
in enhanced protection. In the case of
the university student who was
improperly gathering sensitive personal
information, the university had on three
occasions detected that the student's
computer was performing unauthorized and
suspicious functions, and had informed
him of its discoveries. When the student
nonetheless continued to scan and
infiltrate computers without
authorization, adding to his database of
stolen information, his fate in the
ensuing criminal case was sealed.
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When a male
graduate student pursuing a
degree in military history was
inclined to speak his mind in
classroom
discussions about women in
combat and women in the military
more generally, he felt
inhibited by the university's
broadly worded policy on sexual
harassment.
In pertinent
part, the policy stated that
"all forms of sexual harassment
are prohibited, including . . .
expressive, visual, or physical
conduct of a sexual or
gender-motivated nature, when .
. . such conduct has the purpose
or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's
work, educational performance,
or status; or such conduct has
the purpose or effect of
creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive
environment." The student sued
the university to prohibit the
enforcement of the policy on the
ground that it had a chilling
effect on the exercise of his
right to free speech.
A federal appeals
court sided with the graduate
student. The sexual harassment
policy's prohibition of
expressive conduct of a
"gender-motivated nature" that
had the purpose or effect of
either unreasonably interfering
with other individuals or
creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive
environment was
unconstitutionally overbroad
under the First Amendment. It
impermissibly swept within its
reach speech that should not be
subjected to restrictive
regulation.
Regarding the
"gender-motivated"
characteristic of speech, the
court wondered: "Whose gender
must serve as the motivation,
the speaker's or the listener's?
And does it matter?
Additionally, we must be aware
that ‘gender,' to some people,
is a fluid concept. Even if we
narrow the term
‘gender-motivated' to ‘because
of one's sex,' we are far from
certain that this limitation
still does not encompass
expression on a broad range of
social issues."
The term
"gender-motivated" also
necessarily required an inquiry
into the motivation of the
speaker, so that the policy
punished not only speech that
actually caused disruption, but
also speech that merely intended
to do so. To protect core forms
of speech, there should have
been a requirement in the policy
that the conduct at issue
objectively and subjectively
create a hostile environment. A
school must show that, before
prohibiting it, targeted speech
is so severe or pervasive that
it will actually cause material
disruption, and the university's
policy was fatally deficient for
not having such a requirement.
It was important
to the court's decision that the
challenged harassment policy was
that of a university, as opposed
to an elementary school or a
high school. It is well
recognized that, in the words of
United States Supreme Court
decisions, "[t]he college
classroom with its surrounding
environs is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas,"' and
"[t]he First Amendment
guarantees wide freedom in
matters of adult public
discourse."
Discussion by
adult students in a college
classroom should not be
restricted, while certain speech
which cannot be prohibited to
adults may be prohibited to
public elementary and high
school students. This is
particularly true when
considering that public
elementary and high school
administrators have the unique
responsibility to act in the
place of parents, a disciplinary
and protective role not shared
by their counterparts in
colleges and universities. Thus,
in the case of the plaintiff
graduate student, the court kept
in mind that the university's
administrators were granted less
leeway in regulating student
speech than are administrators
responsible for younger and more
vulnerable students.
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If
you inherit property, of
course you should be
grateful and count your
blessings. Still,
consider the possibility
that the gift may come
with a big string
attached—a debt linked
to the property, such as
is particularly common
with real estate or a
car. In that event, the
question arises as to
whether the debt must be
satisfied from the
particular asset or from
the decedent's estate
more generally. How this
question is answered can
cause a big swing in the
respective gift amounts
for beneficiaries of an
estate.
Historically, the law
presumed that the debt
was not to be paid from
the property that was
connected to it. The
reasoning was that a
true gift should not
come laden with such a
burden. Over time, as
taking on debt became
commonplace, this
thinking changed and
statutes flipped the
conventional assumption.
Increasingly, these laws
start from the premise
that the property left
to someone includes the
debt on the property,
unless the decedent in
his or her will clearly
indicated a different
intent. That is where
careful estate planning,
with professional
guidance, comes in.
It is
best to leave no doubt
for the ordinary lay
reader of a will. A
general directive in the
will to pay all debts of
the testator is too
nebulous. Instead, if
the intent is not to
keep the asset joined to
the debt, language
something like this
should be used in a
will: "If [the specific
asset] is subject to a
mortgage, security
interest, or other lien,
I direct that my
executor pay the debt
from other property of
my estate which is not
given to a specific
person or entity."
This
scenario was played out
recently in a case in
which a farmer left to
his (favored?) son three
different farms, each of
which was encumbered by
debt. To his other son
he left the residue of
the estate. When the
father died, the
executor used part of
the estate proceeds to
pay off the loans to the
farms, so that the first
son would receive them
debt-free. Not
surprisingly, the second
son, whose inheritance
was thereby diminished,
brought the matter to
court.
The
second son prevailed,
forcing payment of the
debts for the farms to
come from the farms
themselves. The father's
will directed in a
general way that debts
were to be paid from the
estate. However, under
the relevant state
statute, that was not a
sufficiently explicit
indication of intent to
satisfy the debts on the
farms from the residuary
estate. In other words,
the will had not clearly
shown an intent that the
first son was to receive
the farms debt-free. As
a result, the first son
got the three farms, but
he, not the second son,
also got the
responsibility for
paying off the
attached
encumbrances, which
totaled almost a quarter
of a million dollars.
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Congratulations to the following OBT
attorneys who have been selected for
inclusion in the 2009 edition of The
Best Lawyers in America:
Robert J. Hambright – who is
being honored at the Best Lawyers 25 th
Anniversary Event in Atlanta, Georgia,
April 23-25, 2009. Robert has been
listed since the publication's
inception 25 years ago
honoring his work and dedication in the
specialties of Labor and
Employment
Law Jack P. Carroll – Personal
Injury Litigation
Benny H. Hughes, Jr. –
listed for at least 10 years in the
specialty of Corporate Law
Gilbert I. Low –
listed for at least 20 years in the
specialties of Commercial Litigation,
Personal Injury
Litigation, and White-Collar Criminal
Defense
J. Hoke Peacock II –
listed for at least 10 years in the
specialty of Commercial Litigation
Gary Neale Reger –
listed for at least 10 years in the
specialties of Banking Law,
Bankruptcy and
Creditor-Debtor Rights Law and Real
Estate Law
Jo Ben Whittenburg –
Health Care Law and Personal Injury
Litigation
Regarded as the
definitive guide to legal excellence in
the United States, selection to Best
Lawyers is based on an exhaustive
peer-review of more than 2.5 million
evaluations by the top attorneys in the
country.
_____________________________________________________________________

Orgain Bell & Tucker, LLP
proudly recognizes its attorneys listed
in Super Lawyers 2008 magazine: Gilbert
I. "Buddy" Low and J. Hoke Peacock II
(Business Litigation); Donean Surratt,
Michael Truncale and Jo Ben Whittenburg
(Civil Litigation Defense); Robert
Hambright (Employment Litigation
Defense); Curry Cooksey (Healthcare);
and David Fisher (Personal Injury
Plaintiff: General).
The annual list by Law &
Politics and the publishers of Texas
Monthly magazine recognizes the top five
percent of lawyers who have received the
highest point totals as chosen by their
peers, as well as through independent
research. They identify highly talented
lawyers in specialty areas for their
outstanding professional achievements.
_____________________________________________________________________

We extend our
congratulations to the following
attorneys for their selection on the
2008 Texas Super Lawyers-Rising Stars
list: Nathan Brandimarte (Business
Litigation); Denise Gremillion (Personal
Injury – Medical Malpractice); Ronda
Harkey (Immigration); Greg
Wilkins (Insurance Coverage). The annual
list by Law & Politics and the
publishers of Texas Monthly magazine
names the state's top up-and-coming
attorneys.
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_____________________________________________________________________
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DISCLAIMER. THE ARTICLES AND OTHER
INFORMATION IN THIS NEWSLETTER ARE NOT LEGAL
ADVICE. YOU SHOULD CONSULT AN ATTORNEY FOR
ADVICE REGARDING YOUR INDIVIDUAL SITUATION. WE
INVITE YOU TO CONTACT US AND WELCOME YOUR CALLS,
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THIS NEWSLETTER AND CONTACTING US DOES NOT
CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. PLEASE
DO NOT SEND ANY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO US
UNTIL AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED. THANK YOU.
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